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Abstract 
In this paper we present a model of tax compliance with heterogeneous agents who 
maximize their individual utility based on income and the conjectured level of per 
capita public expenditure. We formally include psychological drivers in this model. 
These drivers affect individual behavior, such as risk aversion, together with 
appreciation of public expenditure, expectations about peers’ compliance and a natural 
inclination to comply, all of which we summarize in a quality termed “citizenship”. 
The enforcement system, based on random inspections, is standard and only partially 
known to agents. 
The agent-based model is simulated under a variety of settings, representing different 
“societies”. We use the artificial data produced by the model to estimate the effects of 
taxpayers’ traits on personal tax behavior and to build a compliance societal slippery 
slope. At the individual level, we find a positive dependence of compliance on all 
variables, with the significant exception of the tax rate, which has a negative impact. 
As far as societies are concerned, we show how aggregate tax compliance depends on 
composite indices of citizenship and power, and we find that the former is more 
important than the latter. 
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1. Introduction 
The problem of tax compliance has always been central to the theory of public finance, and its 
relevance has increased over time. The seminal models by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and 
Yitzhaki (1974) assume a neat rational framework where individual decisions are taken based 
on a cost–benefit analysis under uncertainty driven by the probability of auditing and the 
effects of fines. An impressive body of research has built on this approach to overcome 
limitations, and now incorporates other determinants of behavior and provides more realistic 
descriptions of observed data. A particularly important issue is excessive tax compliance 
observed in the real world with respect to the level that the standard model of tax evasion 
would predict
1
. Another significant issue is the impact of the level of tax rates on compliance 
which, in Allingham, Sandmo and Yitzhaki‟s works, is ambiguous or opposite to what is 
currently supported by common sense
2
 or experimental findings. It was influentially pointed 
out that all tax-related decisions are not purely individual affairs, but depend on the quantity, 
efficiency and fairness of public expenditure, which should ultimately be financed by tax 
revenues: with no hope of being exhaustive, see Cowell and Gordon (1988), Cowell (1992), 
Bordignon (1993) and Rablen (2010) for up-to-date descriptions. Pyle (1991), Andreoni et al. 
(1998) and, more recently, Sandmo (2005) provide well-written summaries of further 
developments and research themes. After seminal contributions by Schmölders in the 1960‟s, 
see Frank and Kirchler (2006), recognition that psychological factors may be relevant for 
understanding and modeling tax behavior has gained tremendous momentum in the past 
decade, see Kirchler (2007). Compliance, the result of complex interactions between 
taxpayers and their respective Government, is situated on a slippery slope, where both trust in 
authorities and power shape the behavior of a collectivity of agents. Tax morale, see Alm and 
Torgler (2006), Torgler (2007), and knowledge/perception of the enforcement system are 
intuitively useful to explain how taxpayers behave; their importance is empirically and 
experimentally grounded. In our opinion, fewer works have explored how such elements can 
be introduced to formal models of individual responses. One exception is the rich strand of 
agent-based models that offer useful insights through numerical simulations of the complex 
behavior of heterogeneous agents. The seminal contribution in this field can be traced back to 
Mittone and Patelli (2000), who state that tax evasion can spread among agents like 
                                                 
 
1
 See Bernasconi (1998). 
2
 See Bernasconi and Zanardi (2004). 
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outbreaks. Different types of agents can copy other agents‟ actions, if this is myopically 
deemed more convenient and, as a result, in the absence of a sufficient number of audits, 
evaders multiply at the expense of more honest taxpayers. Since then, other authors have 
taken similar approaches. For example, a set of distinct types is exogenously assumed to exist, 
see for instance Hokamp and Pickhardt (2010), who also have agents making random errors 
in their reported income, and Antunes et al. (2007) who consider different bounded rational 
agents. Davis et al. (2003) analyze a model with honest and susceptible agents together with 
evaders and show that if an initially compliant population shifts to evasion, it is difficult to 
reverse the situation and the number of audits must be increased beyond the level that would 
have achieved acceptable compliance in the first place. 
Agent-based models are able to explore several issues that are difficult to tackle using 
analytical models. Repeated interaction among heterogeneous agents or between the fiscal 
administration and the taxpayers can typically be simulated. The model presented in Korobow 
et al. (2007) is an attempt to consider geographical spillovers and “contagion” effects, as 
agents are networked in localized structures and are aware of their neighbours‟ actions, facing 
peer pressure and conformity pressure. It is shown in the paper that substantial sharing of 
payoff information and tax practices can lead to less compliant behavior. While it is not 
entirely surprising that one bad apple can spoil the whole basket, the result also illustrates that 
a certain degree of taxpayers‟ “impressionability” may be conducive to a relatively high 
degree of compliance, even in the event of modest levels of auditing.  
Despite the risk of increasing the number of parameters, the flexibility of agent-based 
methodology facilitates great sophistication in the depiction of many realistic features of 
taxpayers and of the data available to the fiscal authority. Bloomquist (2006) provides a good 
introduction to the field. He describes the Tax Compliance Simulator where audit efficacy and 
celerity, together with a host of other parameters, can be changed to test overall compliance 
and the success of specific auditing schemes with regard to both direct and indirect effects 
(due to additional revenues from fines and greater compliance of other “forewarned” 
taxpayers, respectively). Bloomquist (2011) builds on some of the previous ideas to present a 
situated agent-based model with 85,000 agents who are calibrated using realistic anonymized 
public data from the US Internal Revenue Service. 
At the other extreme, a number of recent papers in the econophysics literature simplify 
relationships bewteen agents and present terse models of interaction based essentially on the 
Ising model of ferromagnetism. In Zaklan et al. (2009), 1,000,000 agents with “spin” are in 
contact on a grid; they are subject to local interactions and, possibly, social forces (due to 
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mass media or cultural biases, say). As is typical of similar models, there are critical 
thresholds of the model‟s parameters that trigger phase changes. In Pickhardt and Seibold‟s 
(2011) recent paper, it is shown that Ising-like models can to some extent reproduce situations 
in which different types of taxpayer are present. 
This paper presents a model with heterogeneous agents who maximize their individual utility 
based on (after-tax) income and the conjectured level of per capita public expenditure. Agents 
have different levels of risk aversion, a distinct relative preference for public expenditure, 
varying confidence in the likelihood that others will pay the amounts due and an innate 
attitude to comply, which can be associated with cultural traits, social constraints or shame. 
Hence, their final decisions rest on micro-founded rational behavior, personal characteristics 
and subjective judgements. The enforcement system, based on random inspections, is only 
partially known to agents. These agents establish noisy estimates of the auditing probability 
by meeting other taxpayers and exchanging information about income. In each period, an 
individual can optimally conceal a certain amount of income based on conjectures about the 
perceived probability of being audited, the perceived level of public expenditure and the 
perceived amount of tax paid by other individuals. 
We contribute to the literature in two main ways. Firstly, we formally include psychological 
drivers in the model that affect individual behavior. Some parameters, broadly related to 
“trust” and tax morale, capture the appreciation of public expenditure and the natural 
inclination to comply. The combination of the previous ingredients with the expectation that 
peers will reciprocate appears to be related to “good citizenship”, a quality that helps agents to 
fulfill their civic duties. Hence, our work suggests ways to link conceptual dimensions to 
specific personal parameters
3
 and shows how to combine them to make a citizenship index. 
Secondly, we use simulated data drawn from a variety of “societies” to estimate a compliance 
slippery slope and then discuss how individual micro-motives aggregate in a variety of social 
macro-behaviors. Such a link is commonly drawn in agent-based approaches but, as far as we 
know, this is the first time a full-fledged slippery slope has been analyzed. On a more 
methodological note, the model generates artificial data that is then used to build a surface 
that correlates well to some stylized facts, even though this is not yet meant to describe any 
specific situation. 
                                                 
 
3
 In some sense, our agent-based model departs considerably from the econophysics paradigm, in which agents 
are electrons with +1 or -1 spins and have virtually no interiority, to allow for a good deal of nuanced 
peculiarities to emerge at the individual level. 
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the agents‟ behavior leaving some 
technical details for Section 3, which is devoted to presenting our simulations and the 
parameters used. We stress that data can be examined at both the personal and the aggregate 
level; results are discussed in Sections 4 and 5 bearing in mind this duality. Section 6 offers a 
summary and a number of final remarks. 
2. The model 
We consider two types of agents, namely individuals and the Government. Individuals 
maximize their utility under a fixed monetary income. The utility function depends on after-
tax income and the perceived level of public expenditure, together with individual attitudes to 
comply, which can be thought of as tax morale. Agents choose the fraction of income to be 
declared in order to pay income tax. Hence, based on heterogeneous parameters, they have the 
option to underreport their income to illegally reduce their tax burden. 
The Government determines the income tax rate, collects all tax payments and uses the entire 
revenue to fund public expenditure, ensuring its budget is always balanced. 
The Government can also counter tax evasion by controlling a fraction of individuals and by 
fining tax evaders. 
Agents face the standard problem of deciding how much of their income they wish to declare 
for income taxation. Each individual i=1, …, N has a cardinal utility function: 
[1]  iiii GyUU ,, , 
where yi is the net (after-tax) monetary income, Gi is the perceived value of public 
expenditure, and  ikii  ,...,1  comprises individual characteristics. We anticipate that i  
allows agents to differ in their risk aversion, relative preference for public expenditure, innate 
attitude to comply and expectations about other agents‟ behaviors (conformity). 
We suppose the utility function satisfies the following assumptions: 
Assumption 1: positive marginal utility of income and public expenditure: 
[2] 0
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Assumption 2: concavity of utility function: 
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Assumption 3: minimum level of utility reached when either 0iy  or 0iG : 
[4] )0,0(),0( )0,(min UGUyUU  . 
The main idea behind our assumptions is that both private income and public expenditure are 
required in a society to provide material and immaterial satisfaction to agents. 
One specification that satisfies all the previous assumptions is: 
[5]   ),(),(,, iiiiiii GyGyU   , 
with 0,0 <> yyy ff , 0,0 <> GGG jj  and   ),0(),0(,0,0 iiiU   . In particular, we assume 
that: 
[6]   iiiiii GyAU
 

1  
, 
where iiii yy




1
),( and 
)1(
),( iiiii GG



 , 0>ir  is the relative risk aversion parameter, 
iA  is an individual scale factor, and 0>ia  represents the relative intensity of individual 
preference for public expenditure with respect to net income.
4
 This preference parameter 
encompasses a variety of individual considerations about the Government‟s behavior 
regarding the use of revenue. For instance, the preference can reflect individual judgements 
about efficiency, fairness, the mix in the provision of public goods and other public 
expenditure. 
To evaluate their utility iU , agents require a certain amount of knowledge of the term in 
square brackets, which in turn requires the likelihood and effects of audits to be taken into 
account and an estimate of public expenditure. Income tax is charged at a constant rate t  on 
the exogenous amount of income Ii, which is known to the taxpayer only. Hence, the amount 
of tax paid by individual i is: 
[7] iii IdT  , 
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 With this Cobb-Douglas-type utility function, concavity requires 11  i , 1)1(  ii  , and 
1)1)(1(  ii  .  
6 
 
where 10  id  is the compliance rate, i.e. the share of gross income declared to the 
Government. Each agent can choose their decision variable id , opting for full ( 0id ), partial 
( 0id ) or no ( 1id ) tax evasion. 
Given the control activity of the Government, each individual faces a probability q of being 
controlled. If individuals are audited, their tax evasion will definitely be discovered and a fine 
of  f  times the amount of evaded tax will be payable: 
[8] iii IdfF )1(  . 
In the simulations of the model presented in Section 3, individuals do not exactly know the 
probability of control q, but estimate their own subjective ip  at any time following random 
interaction with other agents. 
If the taxpayer is not controlled, her net income is  
[9] )1()( iiiii dITIdW  . 
If, instead, the taxpayer is audited, her net income is: 
[10] iiiiiii IdfIFTIdZ  )1()1()(  . 
Each individual knows that, in aggregate, the Government budget constraint holds, hence 
public expenditure is equal to the total tax revenue
5
: 
[11] 
i
ii IdG  . 
However, no agents have full information on the current G  and a conjecture must be used to 
obtain a reasonable tentative estimate. Not surprisingly, it turns out that the way in which G  
is estimated has a considerable impact on decisions. Per capita public expenditure
6
 can be 
split into two parts: the part paid by individual i and the part paid by all others, so that: 
[12] 


N
ikk
kkii Id
N
Id
NN
G
,1
11
 . 
If we define the per capita public expenditure financed by all other individuals as: 
                                                 
 
5
 We assume that fees and revenue raised through enforcement are not used to finance public expenditure. At the 
same time, enforcement costs are not taken into account.  
6
 Cowell and Gordon (1988) explicitly consider the degree of rivalness of public expenditure. Given the 
particular utility function chosen, we omit this feature in the present model because a constant degree of 
rivalness does not alter individuals‟ optimal choices. 
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[13] 



N
ik
k
kki Id
N
g
11
1
  
and, in a society with a large number of agents, we approximate 1/N to 0 and (N-1)/N to 1, we 
get: 
[14] ig
N
G
 . 
It is worthwhile noting that the constant factor N does not affect the optimal choice and, 
without loss of generality, we consider in the following the simplified utility function: 
[15]   iiiiii gyAU
 

1  
. 
When choosing the rate of compliance, each taxpayer has to estimate how other individuals 
react to variations in her contribution
7
. As ig  is not known, the i-th agent must form her own 
expectation ig
~  about other people‟s average contribution. This is modeled as an individual 
adjustment of the level of the previous period per capita public expenditure, 1g , which we 
assume to be publicly observed with a conjecture about other people‟s reaction to their 
variation of the rate of compliance, so that: 
[16]     11
~~
 gIdg iiiii  , 
where iI
~
 is the agent‟s estimate of the average income, i  ( 10 ££ ig ) is a “conformity”
8
 
parameter, as in Cowell-Gordon (1988), and 1g  is the observed level of per capita public 
expenditure in the previous period. 
If 
ig  approaches 1, the agent believes that others will react in the same direction (positive 
conjectural variation). In other words, if the agent increases her compliance rate, she believes 
that all other individuals will behave in the same way. If, on the contrary, 
ig  is close to 0, the 
                                                 
 
7
 See Cornes and Sandler (1986), page 151: “The Nash assumption is that each individual expects no response by 
the rest of the community to variation in his or her own contribution. However, unless the reaction curve of the 
rest of the community is in fact horizontal, reflecting an actual response of zero, such a conjecture is not 
consonant with observable facts.” 
8
 This definition of conformity differs from “group conformity”, defined in Gordon (1989) and Myles and 
Naylor (1996), in which it is assumed that individuals are more likely to evade the more others evade. 
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individual believes that other agents will not change their behavior (zero conjectural 
variation)
9
 and therefore assumes that the per capita public expenditure will remain constant. 
We expect that the higher the compliance rate, the higher the conformity parameter 
ig  will be. 
With respect to Kirchler et al. (2008), we note that conformity is a form of “trust” that has to 
do with other citizens and not with the central government, being related to the perceptions of 
how other taxpayers behave in a given institutional and social framework. 
We finally introduce citizens‟ attitudes towards paying taxes to the utility function, assuming 
that scale factor iA  depends on an individual parameter 0ik : 
[17] i
k
ii dA )1(  . 
For a given level of compliance, factor i
k
id )1(   leads to higher increases in utility the higher 
ik  is. At the same time, a decrement in the compliance rate produces a larger decline in utility 
for individuals with higher ik . Hence, this parameter can be thought of as a measure of the 
agent‟s tax morale or, alternatively, of the “shame” arising due to tax evasion. 
The above definitions lead to the following full specification: 
[18]        )1(11  
1  
1
~
)1(~
iiii
i
i gIdydgyAU iiiii
k
iiiii





 . 
A higher level of compliance then has multiple effects on the level of utility: it decreases 
utility due to a lower net income but simultaneously increases it via the expected per capita 
public expenditure and through the tax morale multiplicative factor. 
Each taxpayer chooses which share of income to declare, di, in order to maximize the 
expected utility: 
[19]   )~,()1(~,)( iiiiiiiii gWUpgZUpdEU  . 
We assume that updates of both 
  
pi and ig
~  depend on random meetings with other agents, 
from which the required sample information about the actual auditing frequency and income 
is obtained. A more formal description is given in the next section.  
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 See Cornes and Sandler (1986) 
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3. Compliance in a variety of societies with heterogeneous agents 
This section is devoted to describing how the previous model can be simulated in an agent-
based framework with many heterogeneous agents. To the best of our knowledge, in fact, it is 
impossible to derive clear implications from the standard comparative statics exercise based 
on first-order conditions. Also, in particular, it is extremely difficult to characterize the 
aggregate behavior of a society of diverse taxpayers with respect to several parameters. 
Hence, numerical simulation appears to be the methodological tool that can shed light on the 
main features of this model more effectively.  
We assume that agents are able to decide which best action is best for them in terms of the 
compliance rate and, indeed, that they can optimize their utility given their personal traits. 
However, their rationality is bounded as they do not exactly know the probability of being 
audited and the amount of tax actually paid by other agents. 
Each agent gathers the necessary information by meeting 

n  other individuals in each period. 
Encounters are random and independent across agents and along time, i.e., each taxpayer will 
meet the same number of newly sampled agents at each time. Although this matching 
mechanism may be oversimplified, it retains the ability to describe settings in which agents 
have volatile estimates of some important variables. From each of her

n  meetings, the agent 
learns: 
 whether the other taxpayer has been controlled; and 
 the other agent‟s level of income. 
Agents do not exchange any information about the amount of tax due or the degree of 
compliance, which seem to be more sensitive pieces of information. As a whole, these 
pairings allow the agent to compute a noisy estimate 

pi  of the true audit probability 

q and of 
the population‟s average income. In realistic situations, we expect the number of meetings 

n  
to be much smaller than the number of agents 

N . Letting 
c
in  (out of 

n) be the number of 
encountered agents who have been controlled, the subjective audit probability for agent 

i  at 
time 

t  is 

ni
c /n . As the Government can change its audit policy at any time, the agent re-
estimates the subjective probability in each period, and we assume that the value 

pi  used in 
the individual utility maximization is a weighted average of her previous estimate (with 
weight  ) and the new estimate nnci /  (with weight 1 ). Therefore, the i-th agent‟s 
subjective probability of being controlled is: 
10 
 
[20] 
n
n
pp
c
i
tiit )1(1,    . 
The very same mechanism is used to estimate the average income, and we assume that the 
sample average income 
iI
~
 observed in the meetings is: 
[21] 


)(
1~
iJj
ji I
n
I , 
where )(iJ  is the set of agents that i meets at time t (which is omitted for notational 
simplicity). 
The Government is in charge of: 
 selecting the tax policy by choosing the level of income tax rate  ; 
 providing public goods and services to be financed by tax revenues; and 
 adopting an adequate auditing policy comprising the choice of the fraction q of 
individuals to control and the rate of penalties 

f . 
With respect to the evasion control policy, we simply assume a purely random auditing 
scheme, so that a share q of all agents is randomly controlled in each period. Furthermore, we 
assume that the Government chooses its fine rate by comparing the punishment for tax 
evasion to those for other offenses, so that both 

f  and 

q are exogenous parameters in the 
model.  
One period of the simulation evolves according to the following steps: 
 agents inherit previous period‟s parameters, maximize utility to decide their tax 
compliance, and pay taxes; 
 the Government funds public expenditure, performs the random control of taxpayers, 
and punishes tax evaders; and 
 agents gather information while meeting other taxpayers and revise their estimates of 
the probability of being controlled and of the average income of the population. 
To this end, we simulate a framework in which agents interact and the levels of public 
expenditure and compliance are stochastic, eventually stabilizing around values driven by the 
distribution of the personal features of taxpayers and by the Government‟s enforcement policy 
(in addition to a handful of other “technical” parameters, such as 

n  and 

 ).  
In each simulation we sample agents from distributions characterized by different individual 
parameters in order to represent different “societies” with specific institutional settings. 
11 
 
In other words, we can interpret a society as a specific set of values for some key parameters 
that shape the inhabitants‟ features and the institutional aspects of the tax collection system. 
Clearly, different societies are likely to exhibit sundry behaviors with respect to aggregate tax 
compliance and public expenditure, and one of the aims of this work is to clarify which 
societal dimensions are the most relevant for developing an illuminating description of 
potentially dissimilar tax-related conducts. Our model allows for diversity both across and 
within societies and it is likely, say, that some free riders coexist with a population of 
taxpayers that, as a whole, is very compliant. Obviously, our approach does not allow us to 
justify why parameters have specific values or how they evolved to reach those values and, in 
this sense, we still have a “black box” issue to address. To partially overcome this problem, 
we study a variety of outcomes and explore possible causal effects by sampling many static 
societies. 
We run 250 simulations in which we pick random institutional parameters and minimum and 
maximum values that characterize the distributions of individual parameters. To avoid 
transient effects and taking into account the fact that the system stabilizes in a few tens of 
periods, we run 200 rounds in each simulation and only keep the data obtained in the last 
simulation. 
 
12 
 
Table 1 – Values of parameters used in the simulations 
Number of societies S 250 
Number of agents N 1000 
Number of meetings per agent n 10 
Institutional settings 
  Distribution Values 
Tax rate   Uniform  [0.2, 0.5] 
Probability of control q Uniform q [0.01, 0.1] 
Penalty per € of tax evaded f Uniform f [1.0, 5.0] 
Individual characteristics 
  Distribution Values 
Income iI  Lognormal mean: 30,000 € 
Standard 
deviation of log: 
log(2) 
Relative risk aversion i  
Uniform 
 maxmin ,  
min [0.0,0.5] max [0.5,1.0] 
Preference for public expenditure i  
Uniform 
 maxmin ,  
min [0.0,0.5] max [0.5,1.0] 
Conformity i  
Uniform 
 maxmin ,  
min [0.0,0.5] max [0.5,1.0] 
Attitude to comply ik  
Uniform 
 maxmin ,kk  min
k =0.0 maxk [0.0,0.5] 
Starting values 
Weight   in 
ip  p  Constant 0.5 
Previous year public expenditure 1g  Constant 0 € 
Subjective probability of control ip  Constant 0 
Estimate of average income 
iI
~
  iI  
 
Table 1 shows the values of parameters used in the simulations. Although agent-based models 
are attractive due to their ability to allow for interaction and the massive heterogeneity of 
agents, this typically results in a large number of parameters. This is sometimes referred to as 
“the wilderness of bounded rationality”10 and is one on the main reasons why it is difficult to 
analytically solve agent-based models. One way to overcome the problem and to reduce the 
number of effective degrees of freedom is to focus on meta-parameters that describe the 
distribution from which individual traits are sampled. Equivalently, meta-parameters can be 
thought of as descriptions of the range of individual parameters, and each society is indeed 
fully described by some values for its meta-parameters. In the following, we will consistently 
use the word “parameter” when individual quantities, such as 

 i  and 

 i , are referred to, 
                                                 
 
10
 See Hommes (2006) and Sims (1980) for the original idea. 
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whereas with “meta-parameters” we denote societal values, such as 

min , 

min  and 

kmin , 
described in Table 1. 
The results of the simulations are basically the agents‟ rates of compliance and the levels of 
per capita public expenditure. We expect that societies with low (high) values of 

min , 

max , 

min , 

max , 

kmin , 

kmax , namely those with low (high) values of preference for public 
expenditure, conformity and attitude to comply, will show low (high) aggregate compliance. 
In a related fashion, societies where low (high) auditing probabilities and penalty levels are in 
place are expected to display a tendency for lower (higher) compliance. 
The results of our simulations are presented in the next sections. In particular, Section 4 
focuses on individuals and provides a descriptive analysis of a cross-section of taxpayers‟ 
compliance, together with a regression analysis intended to show how parameters affect the 
actions of single agents. We also comment on three fictitious taxpayers with low, average and 
high “citizenship” to exemplify different (but somewhat typical) behaviors. Section 5 leaves 
aside individuals and focuses on the study of tax compliance in different societies. We 
identify and discuss the main drivers of aggregate behavior through regressions, and develop 
indices of power and citizenship in terms of the meta-parameters that are largely able to 
explain how societies position themselves on a slippery slope of tax compliance. 
4 Individual compliance 
This section discusses the individual data produced from our 250 simulations. Some 
descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2, which shows the mean, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum values for each parameter. As expected, the values in the “Min” and 
“Max” columns are close to the extremes of the sample ranges described by the meta-
parameters of Table 1. Note that our taxpayers exhibit compliance that spans the whole [0–
100%] interval
11
, with an average of 82.15%.  
The distribution of individual compliance rates is depicted in Figure 1a, where it is apparent 
that a large fraction (54.6%) of agents are nearly fully compliant. However, many agents 
massively underreport their income, producing a remarkably left-tailed distribution. 
                                                 
 
11
 The numerical routine used to maximize [19] under the constraint 10  id  yields results in the range 
  1, . We assume that full compliance is achieved when %99id  and that total evasion prevails when 
%1id . Other reasonable definitions of full compliance and total evasion would yield the same results. 
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Per capita public expenditure values vary widely, too, with a certain amount of concentration 
between 6,000 and 12,000 (see part b of Figure 1). To give an idea of the variability in our 
results, parts c and d of Figure 1 show individual compliance against two individual 
characteristics (attitude to comply and conformity) for a random sample of 5,000 individuals.  
 
Table 2 – Values of variables used in the regression model 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Compliance rate: id  0.821 0.234 0 1 
Income: iI  29919.1 23486.7 936.7 558711.1 
Risk aversion: i  0.502 0.192 0.001 0.997 
Preference for public expenditure: i  0.494 0.185 0.004 0.999 
Conformity: i  0.504 0.189 0.001 0.998 
Attitute to comply: ik  0.128 0.111 0.000 0.496 
Subjective probability: ip  0.055 0.048 0.000 0.396 
Estimate of average income: iI
~
 29916.4 7077.8 11705.6 98064.4 
Previous year‟s public expenditure: 1g  8592.7 2059.2 4104.8 13904.4 
Tax rate:   0.354 0.085 0.200 0.499 
Penalty: f  3.007 1.156 1.034 4.980 
 
To understand the relative importance of individual parameters, we treat the results of the 
simulations as if they were individual observations of a cross-section of 250,000 agents. 
Being the dependent variable d  defined in the range [0,1], we use a tobit regression to tackle 
the large number of censored observations and to estimate linear and quadratic models where 
the compliance rate depends on the parameters listed in Table 3. Other specifications were 
tested and led to inferior results. The censored models presented here appear to be adequate in 
terms of goodness of fit and have an approximately normal residuals distribution. 
All other coefficients apart from income are extremely significant and there is a positive 
dependence of individual compliance on all individual characteristics and enforcement policy 
parameters. In agreement with intuition, instead, tax rate   has a negative impact on declared 
income. The quadratic model in Table 3 has a slightly better fit but, for the sake of exposition, 
we focus on the less complex linear model in the remaining part of the section. 
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Figure 1 – Distribution of individual results (all societies) 
a) Compliance rates b) Per capita public expenditure 
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Table 3 – Tobit regressions of individual compliance rates 
Dependent variable: di                                             Number of obs   =     250,000 
 Linear model Quadratic model 
 Log likelihood =  4,152.20 Log likelihood =  11,212.94 
 Coeff. t Coeff. t 
iI  2.43E-08 1.31 4.21E-08 1.33 
i  0.447 176.13 -0.161 -15.60 
i  0.801 267.89 1.159 100.73 
i  0.794 254.71 1.201 98.09 
ik  1.552 279.47 1.830 134.49 
ip  3.285 284.32 3.000 100.86 
iI
~
 5.62E-06 87.13 1.18E-05 35.00 
1g  3.14E-06 8.80 3.09E-05 15.18 
  -1.610 -207.70 -5.074 -82.64 
f
 
0.078 156.71 0.088 38.58 
iI
2
   -9.00E-14 -0.46 
i
2
   0.631 60.56 
i
2
   -0.400 -35.56 
i
2
   -0.433 -39.27 
ik
2
   -0.821 -22.19 
ip
2   1.972 9.20 
iI
~ 2   -9.50E-11 -19.07 
1g
2   -1.58E-09 -14.53 
 2   4.856 59.02 
f 2   -1.09E-03 -2.99 
constant -0.296 -62.34 0.0257 1.94 
sigma 
(st.err.) 
0.17266 
(0.000469) 
 
0.16564 
(0.000456) 
 
 
2,627  left-censored observations at d=0 
131,584 uncensored observations 
115,789 right-censored observations at d=1 
Note: robust estimates 
 
In a tobit regression, marginal effects are not simply the estimated coefficients; they must be 
computed, as they depend on the chosen values of dependent variables. In order to get an idea 
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of agents‟ behavior, we investigate three typical taxpayers called low, average and high 
citizenship agents. A low citizenship agent has parameters 
  
a, 
  
g  and k  in the lower range of 
possible values and, hence, has relatively low preference for public expenditure, and little 
conformity and attitude to comply. We expect a greater amount of underreporting from such a 
taxpayer, all other variables being equal. Similarly, we consider an average agent with 
parameters set at the average of the possible ranges, and a high citizenship individual with 
relatively large values for 
  
a, 
  
g  and k , who is likely to be very compliant in a variety of 
situations. 
To assess the effects in different institutional frameworks, it is convenient to evaluate the 
reactions of the typical previously defined agents when they are embedded in three societies 
distinguished by low, average and high enforcing power on the part of the Government. 
Hence, we consider a low (respectively, average or high) perceived power society where the 
subjective auditing probability ip  and penalty rate f  are low (average or high). All in all, we 
consider 9 cases (3 types times 3 societies) in our analysis; Table 4 summarizes the relevant 
values of the parameters. As an example, the average taxpayer in an average power society, 
corresponding to the middle column of the second panel in Table 4, believes there is a 5% 
audit probability  per year and fines are equal to three times the tax evaded. 
 
Table 4 – Simulated typical taxpayers 
 Low citizenship Average citizenship High citizenship 
 
Low 
power 
Average 
power 
High 
power 
Low 
power 
Average 
power 
High 
power 
Low 
power 
Average 
power 
High 
power 
i  0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.50 0.50 .75 .75 .75 
i  0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.50 0.50 .75 .75 .75 
ik  0.05 0.05 0.05 0.125 0.125 0.125 .20 .20 .20 
ip  0.01 0.05 0.10 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.01 .05 .10 
f  1 3 5 1 3 5 1 3 5 
Note: all other variables are set at the sample average 
 
The elasticities of compliance rate with respect to individual parameters, computed using 
estimated marginal effects, are reported in Table 5. Take again the average agent in an 
average power society: compliance is about 90% and all parameters positively affect the 
contribution with the exception of tax rate 
  
t . An increase of 1%, say, in the risk aversion 
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parameter   results in an additional compliance of 0.152% on average. The same increment 
in   (+1%) produces an almost two-fold effect on compliance (0.272%).  
 
Table 5 – Elasticities of compliance rates for some typical taxpayers 
 Low citizenship Average citizenship High citizenship 
 
Low 
power 
Average 
power 
High 
power 
Low 
power 
Average 
power 
High 
power 
Low 
power 
Average 
power 
High 
power 
d 16.6% 43.5% 74.9% 66.1% 90.3% 99.6% 98.6% 99.9% 100% 
iI  0.004 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 
i  1.079 0.510 0.275 0.329 0.152 0.013 0.034 0.001 0 
i  0.967 0.457 0.246 0.590 0.272 0.024 0.092 0.002 0 
i  0.959 0.453 0.244 0.585 0.270 0.023 0.091 0.002 0 
ik  0.375 0.177 0.095 0.286 0.132 0.011 0.048 0.001 0 
ip  0.159 0.375 0.404 0.048 0.112 0.019 0.005 0.001 0 
iI
~
 
0.815 0.385 0.207 0.249 0.115 0.010 0.026 0.001 0 
1g  0.130 0.062 0.033 0.040 0.018 0.002 0.004 0.000 0 

 
-2.722 -1.287 -0.694 -0.831 -0.383 -0.033 -0.087 -0.002 0 
f  0.377 0.534 0.480 0.115 0.159 0.023 0.012 0.001 0 
 
Compliance of the average agent decreases by about 0.383% when the tax rate is increased by 
1%. The strong negative sensitivity to hikes in 
  
t  is a robust result of our simulations that 
correlates well with run-of-the-mill intuition.  
Table 5 shows that low citizenship individuals will massively underreport income when little 
power is exerted. Their compliance grows from 16.6% to 43.5% and 74.9% when the 
probability of audit and the penalty rates increase. Agents with average citizenship share this 
behavior to a different degree; they both need the presence of a certain degree of power to 
approach full compliance. 
Figure 2 represents the average compliance of our typical taxpayers under the three 
institutional arrangements. A kind of slippery slope can be discerned from it where both 
power and citizenship contribute at different degrees to obtaining high compliance. A more 
thorough investigation of this topic is deferred to the next section. 
Table 5 offers at least one additional insight related to the strength of different agents‟ 
reactions. Indeed, the elasticities of low citizenship taxpayers are always larger than the 
average, which in turn are larger than those of high citizenship agents. At the two extremes, 
while the sensitivities of low citizenship individuals in a low power society are remarkably 
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pronounced, high citizenship makes agents virtually insensitive to changes in the parameters 
in any power situation (last columns of Table 5). 
 
Figure 2 – Estimated compliance rates for some typical taxpayers 
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5 Societal compliance 
In this section we analyze how meta-parameters (i.e., features of society) affect average 
compliance. We will focus on the different outcomes that can be observed in various social 
contexts and support the finding that estimates based on simulated societies produce a 
slippery slope that depends jointly on measures of citizenship and power.  
The estimates from the previous section implicitly describe individual decisions (based on 
personal conjectures) as if agents were unaware of the characteristics of the community to 
which they belong and, hence, the results do not enable us to assess the effects of a specific 
mix of features that distinguishes a given society. 
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For instance, an agent with particular characteristics (e.g., 5.0 ) can belong to very 
different societies (where 6.00   or 14.0  ), so her tax compliance decision cannot 
be explained by simply looking at her individual parameters. 
Compared with estimates from the previous section, the results presented here depend on 
average and macro-values representative of the whole society that are unavailable to 
individuals. 
We are aware that there are obvious limitations in mapping societies to sets of values for the 
parameters, but the final picture is coherent and, as far as we know, this is the first case in 
which a full slippery slope has been estimated using simulated data arising from “artificial” 
societies. 
The average compliance obtained from each of our 250 simulated societies is regressed 
against the mean of the parameters‟ distributions, which can be derived from the meta-
parameters listed in Table 1. Since the rate of compliance is now an average value for all 
individuals in each society, the dependent variable is no longer censored and lies inside the 
range [0,1]. However, a tobit regression is used again given the nature of the variable. Table 6 
shows the estimated coefficients of the following model for average compliance: 
[22]        fpqpcccaaa kd 2132121 , 
where X  denotes the sample mean of individual variable X (index s=1,…,250 is omitted for 
simplicity). We denote by 3,...,1, jc j  the coefficients related to citizenship and by 
2,1, jp j  the estimates linked to power. 
Table 6 also shows the estimated coefficients of a model with additional squared variables; 
only the four significant squared variables were retained. 
 
21 
 
Table 6 – Tobit regression results: average compliance 
Dependent variable: average compliance rate d                       Number of obs   =     250 
 Linear model Quadratic model* 
 Log-likelihood = 384.21 Log-likelihood = 393.82 
 Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
  0.449 12.56 0.448 13.40 
  0.176 5.29   
  0.370 10.82 0.364 11.04 
k  0.633 12.52 1.252 6.12 
q  1.551 12.69 1.574 13.33 
f  0.050 14.51 0.082 4.30 
  -0.703 -15.33 -1.498 -4.28 
2
    0.173 5.63 
2
k    -2.432 -3.22 
2f    -0.005 -1.71 
2    1.131 2.27 
constant 0.258 7.23 0.366 4.99 
sigma 
(st.err.) 
0.052 
(0.00264) 
 
0.050 
(0.00259) 
 
Note: * selected model that keeps coefficients with p-value<0.10, robust estimates 
 
The coefficients are strongly significant, they have the same sign as those shown in Table 3, 
and the elasticities computed at the sample means, not reported here for brevity, have 
comparable magnitude. 
Compliance depends on variables that can be broadly related to the “power” of the 
Government and to the agents‟ degree of “citizenship”. In particular, expression [22], where 
each term in square brackets has been divided by its maximum value, can be rewritten as: 
[23]    
fpqp
fpqp
fpqp
ccc
ccc
cccA
k
k
kd
21
21
21
321
321
321











  
in which  21 aaaA   and fqk ,,,,    are the maxima of respective meta-
parameters (see Table 1). Defining kC cccA   321   and fpqpAP 21  , the 
average compliance becomes: 
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[24] PPCC AAAd   , 
in which 
[25] 
k
k
C
ccc
ccc





321
321


  
[26] 
fpqp
fpqp
P
21
21


  
can be interpreted as normalized indices of citizenship and power, which are in the range  1,0  
by construction. This formalizes the intuition that citizenship is a mixture of individual 
parameters, whereas, in a similar way, power blends institutional policy variables. 
It is also possible to express compliance from the estimate of the quadratic specification as
12
: 
[27] 
22
PPCCPPCC BBAAAd   . 
Equations [24] and [27] are intuitive expressions that relate citizenship and power indices to 
aggregate compliance. This can be analyzed in different frameworks where attributes of 
citizenship and power change and all other relevant parameters are assumed to be fixed. 
Based on the estimates of Table 6, we obtain the values for PCPC BBAAA ,,,,  given in Table 
7, in which coefficients suggest that citizenship contributes to raising average compliance to a 
greater extent than power.  
 
                                                 
 
12
 This holds under the assumption that 
k
k
C










   and 
f
f
q
q
P  . 
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Table 7 – Coefficients of simulated slippery slopes for a number of tax rates 
Linear model 
Average compliance 
PPCC AAAd    
Constant A,  =20% 0.20538 
Constant A,  =35% 0.09997 
Constant A,  =50% -0.00544 
Citizenship: CA  1.13552 
Power: PA  0.40375 
Quadratic model 
Average compliance 
22
PPCCPPCC BBAAAd    
Constant A,  =20% -0.12807 
Constant A,  =35% -0.25940 
Constant A,  =50% -0.33984 
Citizenship: CA  1.43827 
Citizenship
2
: CB  -0.60791 
Power: PA  0.56667 
Power
2
: PB  -0.13203 
 
In other words, in our model, which includes several more supplementary variables than in 
the classic setup where only risk aversion plays a role, voluntary compliance seems more 
relevant than enforced compliance in determining a society‟s average rate of evasion. Note 
that our citizenship index encompasses more than trust in the Government‟s ability to provide 
valuable public services in a fair manner (mainly captured by preference 
  
a  for public 
expenditure vis-à-vis private income) as it depends also on the belief that other taxpayers will 
react in the same way (conformity 
  
g ), together with an innate attitude to comply (the role of 
  
k). While these components are not new and are often referred to in the literature in isolation, 
we feel that their joint presence, which we termed citizenship, is a novelty that captures 
compliance behavior better than trust in authority alone. 
Our power index is more typical and is based on the two most natural attributes of 
enforcement, namely audit probability and penalty rate. 
Figure 3 shows slippery slopes of compliance in societies where different degrees of 
citizenship and enforcement are in place. Panel a) depicts the surface obtained by using the 
linear model when the tax rate is equal to 35%; the quadratic surface relative to the same tax 
rate is shown in panel b). Although the two pictures look similar, there are some differences: 
the area of full compliance at the top of the surface is larger when the linear model is used 
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and, in particular, in the quadratic specification some evasion is present at the highest level of 
citizenship when power is low. 
The surface is also shown for other tax rate levels, see panels c) and d). A higher (lower) tax 
rate leads to a lower (higher) constant A and, therefore, to less (more) average compliance. In 
the case of 50% tax rate, full compliance is never reached (at least for the ranges of the 
indices arising from reasonable values of the meta-parameters shown in Table 1). 
We stress that the surface is the by-product of the estimate of statistical models from data 
gathered by simulating agent-based societies of heterogeneous utility maximizing taxpayers, 
whereas other researchers, Kirchler et al. (2008), have discussed in depth the merits of the 
slippery slope as a conceptual model of tax behavior and have found some empirical support 
for its plausibility, Muehlbacher et al. (2011). Similarly, our average compliance depends on 
both the citizenship and power dimensions and, interestingly, high values of both indices are 
required to obtain high compliance. By contrast, neither maximum citizenship nor maximum 
power alone would, under most circumstances, suffice to reach the full compliance visible in 
the upper plateau of the surface. This outcome correlates well with the compliance of the 
illustrative types of taxpayers portrayed in the previous section; indeed, Figure 2 can be 
thought of as a caricature of these more detailed slippery slopes. 
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Figure 3 – Simulated slippery slope: societal compliance rate 
a) Linear, tax rate = 35%    b) Quadratic, tax rate = 35% 
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c) Quadratic, tax rate = 20%   d) Quadratic, tax rate = 50% 
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6. Conclusion 
We described an agent-based model of individual tax compliance, where heterogeneous 
agents maximize utility under risk, based on several individual features, such as their 
preference for public expenditure, their personal attitudes to comply, conformity and risk 
aversion. Decisions obviously depend not only on individual traits, but also on the perceived 
quality and quantity of per capita public expenditure and on the recognition that the bulk of 
revenues comes from other taxpayers. Simulations show a wide range of conducts, spanning 
from full honesty to massive underreporting, as expected from the agents‟ large degree of 
heterogeneity. As a whole, however, each society of taxpayers has an aggregate behavior 
shaped by meta-parameters that describe distributions of individual features. From our 
artificial cross-section data we estimate a model that shows how individual compliance 
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depends positively on citizenship-related attributes and on the strength of the enforcement 
system. By contrast, the tax rate negatively affects compliance, other things being fixed. 
We then described and built indices of citizenship and power based on meta-parameters in 
several societies, and estimated a slippery slope fitting the artificial data we generated. This 
exercise produced a surface that is remarkably similar, but adds significant insight to previous 
works by other scholars, stressing the role of habits and beliefs that contributes to the success 
of a civil community. 
Estimates show that, in general, both citizenship and power are required to achieve high 
compliance, where the former has a greater impact than the latter, even though this may be 
caused to some extent by our exploratory choice of meta-parameters, which are not calibrated 
to any specific situation. 
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